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Akers: Commentary on Baldwin

COMMENTARY ON BALDWIN
Ronald L. Akers*
I want to begin with high praise for Professor Baldwin's article.
He has done a superb job of reviewing the cases, judicial reasoning,
legal doctrine, and underlying rationale for the exclusionary rule. He
has shown clearly the historical evolution of the rule, especially since
Mapp, decided in 1961. I found the article highly informative even
though I am familiar with the social science literature and some of
the legal literature on the exclusionary rule. Furthermore, I agree
with Professor Baldwin's fervent support for the exclusionary rule
and found little in the article from which to dissent. I do differ in
some areas, however, as will be obvious from my remarks. Although
I am conversant with the legal doctrine and issues surrounding the
exclusionary rule, I am not a legal scholar. Therefore, I shall direct
my responses primarily from the perspective of a social scientist who
has researched the exclusionary rule and its impact on police behavior
and support for fourth amendment norms in the community.
I agree wholeheartedly that the exclusionary rule has become the
backbone of support for the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution, although historically it may have developed out of the
fifth amendment. Professor Baldwin makes this point in the beginning
and develops it nicely throughout the paper. Indeed, he argues that
the rule has become fundamental to the fourth amendment. The rule
is not just a convenient procedure, but is implicit in the fourth amendment itself and has become almost synonymous with it.
I think we need to be careful, however, about how closely the
exclusionary rule becomes identified as inseparable from the fourth
amendment. I subscribe to the view that the rule is separate from,
although closely allied with, the fourth amendment. Professor Baldwin
states that his purpose is not to plead for a dying rule, but to argue
for a proper burial. If the fourth amendment is nothing without the
rule, does this mean we need to bury the fourth amendment as well?
If the exclusionary rule is dying, is the fourth amendement, which
has become the procedural due process clause, also dying?
I do not think so. While the exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy
that has an exceedingly close relationship with the constitutional norm
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it supports, it is just a remedy and not the only possible remedy as
inalienable as the constitutional right it serves. Abandoning or modifying the rule will not change the constitutional norm for searches and
seizures. Searches must be reasonable; that is, based on probable
cause and proper procedure, regardless of the remedy for deviations
from that standard. Judicial destruction of the rule is not the same
as destruction of the constitutional norm.
Oh the other hand, I do not disagree with Professor Baldwin's
point that attacks on the exclusionary rule, or those aimed at the rule,
have central significance in how assured citizens are that their constitutional rights are protected. The exclusionary rule is obviously the most
appropriate remedy and the greater the extent to which it is compromised, the less secure we can be that law enforcement proceeds
according to the highest due process standards. The exclusionary rule
that mandates suppression of unconstitutionally-obtained criminal evidence is the clearest model for law enforcement adherence to fourth
amendment protection. The rule is preferable to, or at least should
not yield to, alternative civil, criminal, or administrative remedies.
Supreme Court decisions in Leon, Sheppard, Segura, and other cases
Professor Baldwin reviews detract from the effectiveness of the rule,
and create good reason for concern. Nonetheless, I very much hesitate
to say that if the rule is modified, or even done away with, the fourth
amendment will lose all meaning. I do not think that Professor Baldwin
comes to this conclusion either, but it is a reasonable inference from
the close identity between the fourth amendment and the procedure
involved in suppressing evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment.
In addition, I share Professor Baldwin's consternation over the
good faith exemptions allowed in the Sheppard and Leon cases. However, I am not as fully convinced as Professor Baldwin that the principle of a good faith exception is totally damaging to the integrity of
the rule. As far as the police are concerned, a good faith exception
may have positive and negative effects. An exception could so undercut
the day-by-day operation of the rule that searches and seizures of
questionable or clearly unconstitutional character may become more
frequent and lessen police support for fourth amendment norms. I am
unconvinced that this will happen. I believe that recognizing good
faith mistakes may, in fact, undergird the support the rule already
enjoys by countering the argument that the rule sets unreasonable
standards for the police. Changes in the rule may have a similar effect
in public opinion. As a social scientist, I must say that this is an
empirical question to be answered by research, not foreclosed by deductive assertions.
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My colleague Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and I have researched the
exclusionary rule in Florida, studying both law enforcement and public
responses. We have found that the rule already enjoys considerable
support and legitimation among both law enforcement and the public
and is the remedy preferred by both. This should not be surprising
given the long history of the concept of a right to protection from
unreasonable searches in Anglo-American society, which Professor
Baldwin reviews so well in his paper. Professor Baldwin believes that
the rule has fallen from public favor, but this is not what we have
found. Fear of crime exists, but so do appreciation and moral support
for the constitutional norms of security from unreasonable searches
among citizens.
Further, our research revealed that clearly unconstitutional
searches occur with very low frequency. Even questionable searches
are atypical in police work, at least in the kinds of departments in
our study. Challenges in court based on bad searches and loss of cases
through suppression of evidence occur with an even lower frequency.
Police understand and support the standard set by the exclusionary
rule.
Another major point that Professor Baldwin makes, on which he
is absolutely correct, is that deterrence of police misconduct in searches
has almost become the exclusive basis on which the majority in the
Supreme Court has reached decisions in recent cases. The deterrence
doctrine is the major underlying justification for good faith exemptions
to the suppression of evidence allowed in those cases. The majority
in Mapp recognized the centrality of the exclusionary rule in upholding,
according to Baldwin, the rationale of preserving integrity in the guilt
deternination process along with the deterrence rationale. Subsequent
decisions, however, have narrowed the rule to the service of deterrence and have employed a restrictive cost/benefit analysis, much to
the detriment of other aspects of the rule.
This is true not only of court decisions; social research on the
effects of the exclusionary rule has also focused exclusively on the
deterrent effects of the rule on police search behavior. Neither sound
legal reasoning nor good research compels such a result because the
operation of the exclusionary rule has a poor conceptual fit with the
doctrine of deterrence. The deterrence theory is that persons refrain
from criminal acts because of the fear of punishment for the offense.
Illegal conduct is said to be deterred through the threat of direct,
certain, swift, and severe legal punishment for the person committing
the offense. The exclusionary rule is ill-designed to provide a direct
negative sanction for misconduct as envisioned by deterrence theory.
Exclusion of evidence offers at most an indirect sanction and does not
interfere with other possible benefits to law enforcement through col-
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lateral uses. Moreover, the evidence we have from our research is
that the exclusionary rule does not exercise a direct deterrent effect
on police search behavior.
Professor Baldwin argues that courts should recognize integrity of
the law, rather than deterrence, as the central purpose of the rule.
I strongly agree. The operation and effect of the rule fit this concept
and the empirical evidence better than deterrence. The integrity
rationale is supported by public perception and is a model of professional, constitutionally sound law enforcement for the police. Thus, its
impact on the police may come more from educative effects that exert
a positive influence on police behavior and undergird the moral and
professional support for constitutional norms already existing among
the police. In our research we have found more evidence in favor of
the educative and indirect effects of the rule on the police mediated
through the policies of the police department. I wholeheartedly agree
with Professor Baldwin's statement, in section IV.D., that "any process or technique used to replace the exclusionary rule must both
deter future police misconduct and educate law enforcement officials
about prevailing legal standards - a twin goal currently fulfilled by
the suppression hearing and judicial opinion writing." He reiterates
in section IV. E., "If the exclusionary rule is justified simply on deterrence grounds, then the law has reduced its educational and moral
force to the least common denominator."
In summation, Professor Baldwin's analysis of the Court's misplaced reliance on the deterrence doctrine and his emphasis on the
centrality of integrity and educative force of the exclusionary rule are,
in my opinion, correct. Both recent court decisions and social research
on the exclusionary rule have ignored the moral and educative effects
of the rule. Our research has given some support to the idea that the
impact of the rule on police conduct, in fact, does not depend on
deterrence based on the fear of suppression or loss of cases. Rather,
its impact is more related to the professional and constitutional standard that it holds up to the police, both directly and through the department. If the good faith doctrine undermines this, then it will truly
have diminished the exclusionary rule.
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